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This paper is very useful for understanding how the financial system is governed in 
China. There is a widely held belief that the Chinese government (or the Communist 
Party of China) has firm control on Chinese financial markets. However, the underlying 
mechanism through which the Chinese government exercises its controls is far from clear. 
The problem becomes even more challenging as China has established formal ways of 
governing its financial sector (mimicking those in developed countries). So, more 
fundamentally, how can the Chinese government continue to maintain the direct state 
control given the substantial ownership changes over the past decade? This paper looks at 
a dataset covering a total of more than 150 top administrators or managers and concludes 
that human resource management (HRM) has become an important substitute to the 
formal governance of finance in China. The approach of the paper is innovative: 
Checking whether those top office holders occupy important positions at other financial 
organizations concurrently or have held such positions prior to their current one. This 
reveals a close network of financial cadres whose career life is essentially supervised by 
the Chinese government (or more precisely, the Communist Party’s Central Organization 
Department).  
 
The evidence may also shed some light on the co-existence of the inefficient credit 
allocation and the efficient policy implementation that has puzzled many outsiders for a 
long time. On the one hand, financial imperfection in China and its efficiency losses have 
been well documented. For instance, the Chinese banks —mostly state owned —tend to 
offer much easier credit to SOE. In a recent paper (Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2010), 
we show that such asymmetric financing ability, interacted with the resource reallocation 
between the state and private sectors, may explain the rapid (inefficient) accumulation of 
foreign reserves in China. On the other hand, however, the Chinese financial system 
behaves in a remarkably efficient way to implement monetary stabilization policies. A 
well-known achievement is that in order to cool the potentially overheating economy, 
PBOC has been successfully sterilizing the foreign exchange market intervention with no 
major impacts on the domestic interest rate. Another example comes from the massive 
drop in new bank loans in December 2007, right after the Chinese government decided to 
tighten its monetary policy (see Table 1). Governance through HRM can easily explain 
both the inefficient credit allocation and the efficient policy implementation.   
 
Table 1. New Bank Loans in December   
                    ------------------------------------------------- 
1 Billion RMB   
                    ------------------------------------------------- 
2006     214.4  
2007     48.5  
2008     764.5  
                    ------------------------------------------------- 
Source: PBOC website.    
 
 
An important question is whether HRM is unique to China? First of all, the concept of 
HRM is not new. It is actually similar to the idea of “personnel controls” in the literature 
of economic transition. The government exercises its ultimate control over SOEs through 
personnel selection and dismissal, though some control rights are in hands of SOE 
managers (e.g., Qian, 1996). Moreover, as mentioned in the paper, some developed 
countries like Finance also feature elite concentrations. A similar pattern of career 
development can even be found in the U.S., though the direction of the movement is 
different. Therefore, I am perfectly in line with a future research plan outlined in the 
paper: “Future research should focus on how these structures help shape influence the 
formal structures that govern finance —not only in China, but also in the west.”   
Although this paper has explored very detailed individual data, some extra information 
can be potentially useful for addressing other interesting and related questions. For 
instance, a key issue is about the implementation of HRM. What if a bank CEO decides 
not to follow the Chinese government or the Communist Party? Can we reveal a 
reward/punishment scheme from the data? The existence of a personnel network is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the Chinese financial sector is governed through HRM, 
but it is not a direct test of the hypothesis.   
 
Let me end with a remark about the future of HRM. The paper points out an 
interesting feature of HRM: It can be compatible with the global markets and may even 
influence the future governance of the global financial system. However, I still want to 
take up two issues from other perspectives. First, given the fast development of the 
private financial sector in China, it would be increasingly difficult for the Chinese 
government to control the markets by exercising HRM within the state sector. Second, 
when appointing a bank COE, the Chinese government clearly faces a tradeoff between 
her/his loyalty to the party and ability of profit maximization. Assuming that these two 
variables are uncorrelated (not a totally crazy assumption), a political economy model 
would predict a strengthening (relaxing) of HRM in periods when the government runs 
budget surpluses (deficits).   
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